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THE UNREVIEWABILITY OF EMERGENCY ORDERS OF
THE FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY-THE CONCEPT
OF PREVENTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
HENRY M. SCHMERER*
And the rule of the law, it is argued is preferable to that of any in-
dividual. . . . [But] there may indeed be cases which the law seems
unable to determine . . . and appoints [officers] to determine matters
which are left undecided by it, to the best of their judgment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Federal Aviation Agency
Two commercial airliners collided in mid-air over the Grand
Canyon, killing 128 people, on June 30, 1956. This and other air trag-
edies were part of the momentum which resulted in Congressional enact-
ment on August 23, 1958,' of the Federal Aviation Act of 19582 [herein-
* Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law Review; Student Assistant in Instruction
for Freshmen, University of Miami School of Law; formerly Law Clerk, Enforcement
Division, Office of the General Counsel, Federal Aviation Agency.
1. 2 WEST, FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 1801 (1960); Comment, 57 MICH. L. REV. 1214
(1959).
2. 72 Stat. 731 [hereinafter cited as Act], 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1958). The fore-
runner to the Act was the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973. Since most
of the provisions in both acts are substantially the same, cases interpreting the 1938 Act
will be cited.
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after referred to as the Act] creating the Federal Aviation Agency
[hereinafter referred to as the FAA] as an independent agency of the
government to promote air safety.' The FAA is headed by an Admin-
istrator who exercises all powers and has complete responsibility for
the agency,4 which in 1962 had 43,000 employees5 and a budget of
729.8 million dollars.'
The Act also provides for the continuation of the Civil Aeronautics
Board [hereinafter referred to as the CAB], with one of its functions
being the review of the Administrator's orders involving safety cer-
tificates. 7  There appears to be no constitutional barrier preventing
Congress from creating agencies to regulate air safety affecting inter-
state commerce to the exclusion of state regulation. 8
B. The Emergency Powers
The emergency powers of the Administrator under the Act are in
sections 6091 and 1005(a). They have been considered to be of an
"awesome nature,' since the Administrator's emergency orders are
effectual without prior notice or hearing, and they remain in effect
during appeal.
Section 609, set out in the margin, 2 gives the Administrator the
3. Act § 103,49 U.S.C. § 1303 (1958). "It promotes safety through certification of air-
men, aircraft, and such air agencies as flight and ground schools, and checks the design,
structure, and performance of new aircraft to insure the safety of the flying public." FEDERAL
AVIATION AGENCY, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK or AVIATION 1 (1961). See generally 2 WEST,
FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL §§ 1801-52 (1960).
4. Act § 301(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1958) ; Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d
892, 894 (2d Cir. 1960).
5. THE FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY 2 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 0-6095.49, 1961)
(pamphlet).
6. FEDERAL AViATION AGENCY, THiRD ANNUAL REPORT 50 (1961).
7. Act § 609, 49 U.S.C. § 1429 (1958). The CAB's largest function is the economic regu-
lation of aviation. It also has the duty of accident investigation and the determination of
probable cause of accidents. See 2 WEST, FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 1804 (1960).
8. Rosenhan v. United States, 131 F.2d 932 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 790
(1943); cf. United States v. Drumm, 55 F. Supp. 151 (D. Nev. 1944). The constitutional
source is based on the commerce clause as opposed to a national ownership of air space.
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954) (dictum) ; Allegheny Air-
lines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 812
(2d Cir. 1956) (dictum). See also Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F.2d 929 (N.D.
Ohio 1930), modified, 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932).
9. 49 U.S.C. § 1429 (1958).
10. 49 U.S.C. § 1485(a) (1958).
11. Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 305 F.2d 588, 591 (5th Cir. 1962), petition for
cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3221 (U.S. Jan. 3, 1963) (No. 719). The Attorney General has
approved the exercise of emergency powers by the Administrator. Leonard J. Spect, 25
C.A.B. 859, 891 (1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d 905 (8th Cir. 1958).
12. AMENDMENT, SUSPENSION, AND REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATES SEC. 609. The
Administrator may, from time to time, reinspect any civil aircraft, aircraft, engine,
propeller, appliance, air navigation facility, or air agency, or may reexamine any
civil airman. If, as a result of any such reinspection or reexamination, or if, as a
result of any other investigation made by the Administrator, he determines that
safety in air commerce or air transportation and the public interest requires, the
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power to amend, suspend, modify, or revoke any airman, aircraft, or
air production certificate when the Administrator determines that "safety
in air commerce or air transportation and the public interest" requires
the action. If the Administrator advises the certificate holder as to
the emergency, no hearing is necessary. An aggrieved person may file
an appeal with the CAB which stays the effectiveness of the Adminis-
trator's order unless the Administrator notifies the CAB that an emer-
gency exists. In that event, the CAB must dispose of the appeal within
sixty days after receiving the notice. 3 In all cases, the CAB's order
is subject to judicial review in the courts of appeals. 4
Section 1005(a), set out in the margin, 1" permits the Administrator
Administrator may issue an order amending, modifying, suspending, or revoking,
in whole or in part, any type certificate, production certificate, airworthiness
certificate, airman certificate, air carrier operating certificate, air navigation facility
certificate, or air agency certificate. Prior to amending, modifying, suspending, or
revoking any of the foregoing certificates, the Administrator shall advise the holder
thereof as to any charges or other reasons relied upon by the Administrator for
his proposed action and, except in cases of emergency, shall provide the holder of
such a certificate an opportunity to answer any charges and be heard as to why
such certificate should not be amended, modified, suspended, or revoked. Any
person whose certificate is affected by such an order of the Administrator under
this section may appeal the Administrator's order to the Board and the Board
may, after notice and hearing, amend, modify, or reverse the Administrator's order
if it finds that safety in air commerce or air transportation and the public interest
do not require affirmation of the Administrator's order. In the conduct of its hear-
ings the Board shall not be bound by findings of fact of the Administrator. The
filing of an appeal with the Board shall stay the effectiveness of the Administrator's
order unless the Administrator advises the Board that an emergency exists and
safety in air commerce or air transportation requires the immediate effectiveness
of his order, in which event the order shall remain effective and the Board shall
finally dispose of the appeal within sixty days after being so advised by the Ad-
ministrator. The person substantially affected by the Board's order may obtain
judicial review of said order under the provisions of section 1006 [49 U.S.C. § 1486],
and the Administrator shall be made a party to such proceedings. 49 U.S.C. § 1429
(1958).
13. The forerunner of this provision was Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 609,
52 Stat. 1011, as amended, Reorganization Plan No. 111 of 1940, 54 Stat. 1233, permitting
the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics to make suspensions only in emergency situations
for a maximum of two 30 day periods. See Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, Part 6, S. Doc. No. 10, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1941).
14. Act § 1006, 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1958). The Administrator cannot appeal from an
adverse CAB order. Lee v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 225 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Contra, id.
at 952 (dissenting opinion by Judge Prettyman). The Administrator can appeal to the
CAB from an adverse order of the CAB's examiner. Spect v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 254 F.2d
905 (8th Cir. 1958).
15. EmFcnrIV DATE OF ORDERS; EERGENCY ORDEIS' SEC. 1005(a). Except as other-
wise provided in this Act, all orders, rules, and regulations of the Board or the
Administrator shall take effect within such reasonable time as the Board or Ad-
ministrator may prescribe, and shall continue in force until their further order,
rule, or regulation, or for a specified period of time, as shall be prescribed in the
order, rule, or regulation: Provided, That whenever the Administrator is of the
opinion that an emergency requiring immediate action exists in respect of safety
in air commerce, the Administrator is authorized, either upon complaint or his own
initiative without complaint, at once, if he so orders, without answer or other form
of pleading by the interested person or persons, and with or without notice, hearing,
or the making or filing of a report, to make such just and reasonable orders, rules,
or regulations, as may be essential in the interest of safety in air commerce to
meet such emergency: Provided further, That the Administrator shall immediately
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whenever he "is of the opinion that an emergency requiring immediate
action exists in respect of safety in air commerce" to make "just and
reasonable orders" without the necessity of giving notice or hearing or
following any other usual procedure. Upon issuing an emergency order
the Administrator has the duty to "immediately initiate proceedings
relating to the matters embraced in any such order."'
The legislative history of the Act' 7 is silent as to the existence
of any distinctions between the emergency powers in sections 609 and
1005. One distinction could be that they are different power sources-
section 1005 being used for more drastic action. For instance, the Ad-
ministrator might want to maintain the emergency order after sixty
days had expired and the CAB had not acted on the appeal.', Another
distinction could be that they are redundant sections-neither having
greater weight than the other. Another possible distinction is that they
are dependent on one another-section 1005 creating the power and
section 609 implementing the procedure to be used. These distinctions
could create problems. For instance, since only section 1005 uses the
word "opinion," the Administrator might be able to use more discretion
if he acted under that section instead of section 609. In another situ-
ation section 609 could be more helpful to the Administrator since he
could decide a situation is an emergency at the time the certificate holder
appeals to the CAB even though the original notice affecting the cer-
tificate did not say it was an emergency.'" If the Administrator acts
under both sections at the same time, distinctions between the two
sections could probably be avoided. Therefore, both will be considered
as giving rise to the same discretionary exercise of power.
C. The Problems Confronting Certificate Holders
Since an emergency order of the Administrator could be operative
for sixty days or longer, the certificate holder could claim irreparable
injury" as a result of the Administrator acting without authority or
acting in an arbitrary or capricious manner.2
initiate proceedings relating to the matters embraced in any such order, rule, or
regulation, and shall, insofar as practicable, give preference to such proceedings
over all others under this Act. 49 U.S.C. § 1485(a) (1958).
16. The forerunner of this provision was the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601,
§ 1005(a), 52 Stat. 1023, as amended, Reorganization Plan No. IV of 1940, § 7, 54 Stat. 1235,
limiting the emergency power to the CAB.
17. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL AVIATiON AcT OF 1958 (Gov't Printing Office)
(compilation of congressional reports); [1958] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 3741.
18. Compare Leonard J. Spect, 25 C.A.B. 859, 891 (Order E-11187, 1957), aff'd as to
other orders, 254 F.2d 905 (8th Cir. 1958). See also Propeller Service Corp. 13 C.A.B. 555
(1952) ; Regina Cargo Airlines, Inc. 13 C.A.B. 511, 515 (1950).
19. See Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 305 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1962), petition for cert
filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3221 (U.S. Jan. 3, 1963) (No. 719).
20. "[Tlhe suspension would destroy property, not a license property but investment
and business property." Standard Airlines, Inc. v. Civil. Aeronautics Bd., 177 F.2d 18 (D.C.
Cir. 1949).
21. In Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., supra note 19, at 591, the court labeled the
1963]
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An air carrier or a parts overhaul shop might allege irreparable
injury in that the public will react adversely to an alleged safety vio-
lation, public relations will be impaired, large expenditures of time and
money will be necessary to defend the charge, employee morale will
decline, and, especially with irregular air carriers 22 or small overhaul
shops, financing arrangements will be jeopardized.2 3  Airmen or me-
chanics might allege loss of reputation and livelihood as a result of an
emergency order.2"
While the CAB has sixty days to dispose of the appeal, it will not
review or stay the emergency order prior to the hearing on the merits
as to the final disposition of the case.2 Nor will the CAB take into
account financial losses resulting from an emergency order .2  The sole
relief the CAB will give, in cases in which the CAB enters a final order
of suspension, is credit for the period the certificate was suspended on an
emergency basis." Thus, any immediate relief, if available, lies with
the courts.2
8
Some of the problems to be considered when relief is sought in the
courts are :29 Can the FAA take emergency action? Is the Administrator
personally liable for misuse of his authority? What forms of relief are
available? Do the courts of appeals have jurisdiction? May a district
court take jurisdiction? To what extent may a court review the order?
And finally, the ultimate question-Should an emergency order by the
Administrator of the FAA relating to safety in the air be subject to review
by any court?
II. BASIS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
A. In General
What constitutional students call procedural due process-the right
charges listed by the Administrator as a "blunderbuss." See text accompanying notes 182-88
infra.
22. Different safety regulations are applicable to the various holders of CAB economic
certificates. See 14 C.F.R. pts. 40, 42, 45 (1962).
23. See Twentieth Century Airlines, Inc. v. Ryan, 74 Sup. Ct. 8 (Reed, Circuit Justice,
1953).
24. See Glenn T. Andrews, 29 C.A.B. 1496 (1959), where a loss of several thousand
dollars on a planned fishing trip was alleged. See also Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., supra
note 19.
25. Leonard J. Spect, supra note 18; Richard S. Ewing, 26 C.A.B. 816 (1957) (by im-
plication).
26. Glenn T. Andrews, 29 C.A.B. 1496 (1959).
27. Ibid.; Charles M. Griffin, Jr., 13 C.A.B. 524 (1951).
28. A dramatic method of calling the court's attention to the order is by resisting it
and then asserting as a defense the invalidity of the order. See 3 DAVIS, ADmsImnVE
LAW TREATISE § 23.07 (1958) [hereinafter cited DAVIS]; JAFn% & NATIEANSON, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 798 (1961). Orders of the Administrator may be enforced
by a district court. Act § 1007, 49 U.S.C. § 1007 (1958).
29. "A person should not be relegated to setting sail in a fragile bark, in order to seek
adventure on a partially charted sea." Judge Holtzoff in Pan American World Airways, Inc.
v. Boyd, 207 F. Supp. 153, 160-61 (D.D.C. 1962).
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to notice and hearing before the government can compel an act or take
away a right-is a historical part of the development of Anglo-American
law." Thus, the very essence of an emergency action-withholding a
hearing, and many times notice, until after the action is completed 3 1 -is
on its face repugnant to due process. Yet, who would say that while
the building is burning the firemen cannot destroy another building to
prevent the spread of fire?32 Thus, we have an anomaly in our law. 3
"Emergency powers for the protection of health and safety in the
face of immediate danger ought to be conceded, but they have no clear
basis in our common law. ' Inroads have been made in the areas of
public health and safety, public order, and the collection of revenue.
They have come about by judicial abdication, statutory provisions, and
the application of a doctrine of residual prerogative power in the govern-
ment.35 In continental countries summary action is customary. 6
B. Due Process Clause
The Supreme Court has held that summary actions by a state to
abate the nuisance of illegal fishing nets3 7 and to destroy food which is
unfit for human consumption" did not conflict with the due process
clause. While the Court has never established a general principle of
emergency power for the federal government,39 it has permitted the
government to dispense with notice and hearing in situations which
Congress has determined might give rise to an emergency situation.4 °
Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement
30. See de Smith, The Right to a Hearing in English Administrative Law, 68 HARv. L.
REv. 569 (1955).
31. As to a possible distinction between notice and no notice prior to the administrative
action see HART, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 561 (2d ed. 1950).
32. See 1 DAVIS § 7.08. The community would not be able "to await the slow course
of judicial proceedings" nor could it be expected that the legislature could anticipate all
situations or make inflexible rules to govern emergencies. Powell, Administrative Exercise
of the Police Power (pts. 1-3), 24 HARV. L. REV. 268, 333, 441 (1911). These emergency
actions have been classified by text writers as the "summary abatement of nuisances." See
generally, FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVE PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 102 (1928);
HART, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 548-89 (2d ed. 1950).
33. FREUND, op. cit. supra note 32, § 96.
34. Id. § 109, at 210. Contra, Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 142 (1894).
35. LEISERSON, ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION 57 (1942). See generally DicanssoN, AD-
MINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 251-306 (1927).
36. For a discussion of German law see FREUND, op. cit. supra note 32, §§ 96-109.
37. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). For a view that this case should be limited to
goods of small value, see SWENSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 153 (1952).
38. North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
39. In re Naegle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), permitting the President to issue an order, in the
absence of a statute, for the Department of Justice to protect Justice Field on his circuit
travels, could have afforded the opportunity to establish a general principle of emergency
power. FREUND, op. cit. supra note 32, § 96.
40. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (misbranded food);
Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (bank receiver); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414 (1944) (price controls) ; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (tax collection);
1 DAvIS § 7.08.
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of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the
opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of
the liability is adequate. Delay in the judicial determination of
property rights is not uncommon where it is essential that gov-
ernmental needs be immediately satisfied.41
While the constitution does not prohibit the procedure used in an
emergency situation, the problem still remains as to whether the action
taken was for a lawful purpose.42
C. Certificates
Immediate action is also necessary when a certificate or license
holder is in a position to jeopardize the safety of a large number of
people.4 3  The state of New York permitted a police commissioner
to revoke summarily permits of airmen who piloted aircraft towing
banners over a city. While recognizing the hardship of the individual
case, the New York court upheld the action "as an exercise of the police
power in protecting health and promoting the welfare of the community
at large. '
'44
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held
that the CAB could not suspend a non-safety certificate on an emergency
basis without a provision in the Act.4 In a latter case the court men-
tioned that a different result would have been reached if a safety regu-
lation had been involved.46
While the Supreme Court has not yet adjudicated the emergency
provisions of the Act, Fahey v. Mallonee47 would appear to indicate that
the Court would uphold those provisions. In Fahey the Court permitted
41. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931). See also Jordan v. American
Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 281, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
42. See PARKCER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 34-35 (1952).
43. SCHWARTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 122 (2d ed. 1962).
See automobile driver license cases: Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1953); Com-
monwealth v. Walkinshaw, 373 Pa. 419, 96 A.2d 384 (1953). See also the Pure Food and
Drug Act which permits theimmediate suspension of permits. 21 U.S.C. § 344(b) (1958).
44. S.S. Pike Co. v. City of New York, 169 Misc. 109, 6 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
See also Tatum v. City of Hallandale, 71 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1954).
45. Standard Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 177 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
Professor Davis criticizes the case on the basis that the court should have inquired into the
reasons of the CAB for taking the immediate action. But Professor Davis read the words
"of convenience and necessity" into the emergency provision of the statute, which was
applicable only to safety certificates. 1 DAVIS § 7.08. Civil Aeronautics Act of June 23, 1938,
ch. 601, § 609, 52 Stat. 1011.
The same court has permitted the CAB to issue an emergency order permitting an airline
to receive financial assistance without a full hearing as required by statute. The record
showed that the public interest required that the airline be kept in operation. The alleged
harm was to the objecting competing airline only. National Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics
Bd., 306 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
46. R. A. Holman & Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 299 F.2d 127, 132 n.9 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962).
47. 332 U.S. 245 (1947). See discussion in JAFFE, ADMINISTRArIVE LAW 303 (1953).
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the Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to appoint a
conservator to take possession of a bank without a hearing. The order
was justified on the grounds of giving protection to the public, because
this was a customary procedure in dealing with a bank, and because the
bank accepted its charter subject to the rules thereunder.
The Administrative Procedure Act48 [hereinafter referred to as the
APA] is applicable to the FAA.49 Section 9(b) of the APA 5° exempts
from the requirement of giving notice or an opportunity for compliance,
license "cases of willfulness 5' or those in which the public health,
interest or safety requires otherwise." The legislative history of this
section indicates an intent to have the provision operate "irrespective
of the equities or injury to the licensee," but not to permit agencies to
act arbitrarily.52 Because of the exception for public safety, section 9(b)
of the APA might not be applicable to any portion of section 609 of the
Act.53
D. Tort Liability of the Administrator54
In 1908 the Supreme Court, in permitting a state to summarily
destroy food which was unfit for human consumption, suggested in dictum
that the owner of the food would have a remedy for damages against
the party seizing the food if it later was proven that there was an
erroneous destruction.55 The suggestion of suing a government officer
later has been criticized because it would bankrupt honest officials,
"chill" official enthusiasm for rigorous enforcement, and submit issues
of expert judgment to lay juries." It appears that the Supreme Court
has never followed its own advice.57  The federal courts have granted
officers immunity from civil liability in the exercise of discretionary
power, whether it be negligently58 or intentionally59 done.60
48. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958).
49. See Act § 1001, 49 U.S.C. 1481 (1958); APA § 12, 5 U.S.C. 1011 (1958).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 1008(b) (1958).
51. Great Lakes Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 291 F.2d 354, 361 .(9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 890 (1961); Walker v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 251 F.2d 954 (2d Cir.
1958); Air Transport Associates, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 199 F.2d 181, 186 (D.C.
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 922 (1953).
52. Current Material, AD. L. Statutes 35, 82 (2d ser. 1951).
53. See John E. Clark, 23 C.A.B. 1013, 1025 (Initial decision 1956) (semble).
54. The FAA could not be sued because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See 3
DAvIs §§ 25.01-.17. The Federal Tort Claims Act exempts discretionary functions. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a) (1958). Compare Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), with
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
55. North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908). See
generally 3 DAVIS §§ 26.01-.07.
56. JA. FE, ADMINISTRATIVx LAW 309 (1953). See 3 DAVIS § 26.07.
57. 3 DAVIS § 26.05 n.10.
58. Id. § 26.01.
59. Id. § 26.04.
60. In Jones v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 298 U.S. 1 (1935), the SEC was held to
have acted arbitrarily in not permitting the withdrawal of a registration statement. There-
after, Jones sued the members of the SEC individually for conspiring to destroy his business
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III. THE REMEDIES
A. Common-Law Remedies
Section 1106 of the Act 6' provides:
Nothing contained in this Act shall in any way abridge or
alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute,
but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies.
The applicability of this section is probably limited to suits between
private parties in the field of aviation which do not involve the Act.2
Furthermore, a common-law remedy could not be used when the effect
would be to render the provisions of the Act nugatory. 3
Section 10(b) of the APA"4 provides that in the absence or inade-
quacy of the statutory review, relief may be obtained by "any applicable
form of legal action (including actions for declaratory judgments or
writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus) in any
court of competent jurisdiction." Congress intended this provision to
be a "recognition of the so-called common-law actions as being appro-
priate and authorized means of judicial review."65
The common-law extraordinary writs66 of mandamus,6" prohibition,"
quo warranto, 9 certiorari,70 and habeas corpus"' would by definition
by not permitting his withdrawal of registration. Jones alleged their acts were malicious
and in bad faith. The case was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. "The fact that the Commission misjudged the exact confines of its jurisdiction
over registration statements . . . to which two [lower] courts and three Supreme Court
Justices [dissenting] agreed, is a long way from acting palpably beyond the duties of an
office. It is the normal, necessary thing for an administrative body to make that type of
determination in the first instance." Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40, 43 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 665 (1941).
61. 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1958). See 4 DAVIS § 28.03, for a discussion of the statement
Justice Frankfurter made dissenting in Starke v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 312 (1944): "There
is no such thing as a common law of judicial review in the federal courts."
62. See Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 6 Av. Cas. 18, 262 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960).
63. Cf. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 1009(b) (1958).
65. Current Material, AD. L. Statutes 36, 83 (2d ser. 1951).
66. For judicial remedies today against administrative agencies see generally JAFFE &
NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 778-801 (1961); PARKER, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW 271-77 (1952); SWENSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 215-33 (1952). The
legal profession has neglected and under-estimated the right to review agency action by
common-law means. LAVERY, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 206 (1952).
67. Mandamus can be issued only for a ministerial act, where there is no room for
discretion. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Peters) 524 (1838).
68. Prohibition is used to curb excess of jurisdiction by tribunals of limited jurisdiction.
United States ex rel. Denholm & McKay Co. v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 125 F.2d
557 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
69. Quo warranto is used for trying title to an office or the right to exercise a public
franchise. SWENSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 217 (1952).
70. Certiorari is used only for reviewing judgments of inferior tribunals where there
is no other method of review. It is not used by federal courts to review administrative orders.
Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U.S. 162 (1913).
71. Habeas corpus may only be used when there is a physical restraint of an individual.
SWENSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 218 (1952).
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not be applicable to the emergency orders of the Administrator. In
addition, the federal courts are reluctant to employ the writs of
prohibition,72 certiorari,73 and quo warranto. 74 A mandamus action could
lie 71 to compel the CAB to dispose of the appealed order without unrea-
sonable delay.76
Injunctions and declaratory judgments,77 usually in a combined
form 78 have become acceptable means of reviewing administrative action.
The use of an injunction would solve the problems of certificate holders.
The Administrator would be restrained from enforcing his emergency
order, and he would have to follow the procedures for non-emergency
orders if he desired to take action on the certificate.
B. Injunctions
An injunction may be issued when there is a threat of irreparable
injury-the loss of business, and an inadequate remedy at law-and no
provision for judicial review.7 9
But the injunction as a means of reviewing administrative
action has moved away from its historical foundations in equity
and has become a general-utility remedy for use whenever no
other form of review proceeding is clearly indicated. Courts
frequently omit all inquiry into satisfaction of the requisites
of equity jurisdiction.80
However, the chances for the certificate holder to secure injunctive relief
are remote. An injunction does not lie when the public interest is
paramount to any threatened loss or damage."
72. 3 DAVIS § 23.13.
73. Id. § 23.14.
74. SWENSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 216 (1952).
75. It is questionable whether courts outside the District of Columbia can issue manda-
tory relief against the federal government. See 3 DAVIS § 23.10. Rule 81(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, abolishing the writ of mandamus, has not abolished the reliel. Ibid.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1958).
76. See APA §§ 6(a), 10(e)(A), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1005(a), 1009(e)(A) (1958); Deering
Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958). "[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act is not an independent
source of federal jurisdiction; . . . the availability of such relief presupposes the existence
of a judicially remediable right." Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 677 (1960). For a view
that declaratory judgments should be used more frequently in administrative law as a form
of judicial review see Lavery, The Declaratory Judgment in Administrative Law, 14 F.R.D.
479 (1953).
78. 3 DAVIS § 23.04.
79. See WALSH, EQuTrY § 41 (1930).
80. 3 DAVIS § 23.04, at 308. (Emphasis in original.) When the FAA or CAB seek an
injunction under the Act for enforcement of an order it is not necessary to show irreparable
injury since the right to an injunction is specifically conferred by section 1007(a) of the Act.
Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Modem Air Transport, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd,
179 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1950).
81. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 182 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 276 F.2d 892
(2d Cir. 1960).
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In Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. 2 the Food and Drug
Administrator made multiple seizures of misbranded articles. The ap-
plicable statute8" permitted the Administrator to act in that manner when
he has "probable cause to believe from facts found" that the article
was mislabeled. Even though it was not shown that the seized articles
were unhealthy, Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, held that
to issue an injunction would interfere with the speedy protection Congress
provided for in the statute. The Court considered it immaterial that
the Administrator's action caused irreparable damage to a business.
The Administrator's determination of probable cause was considered
conclusive on that issue, similar to a grand jury indictment or a prose-
cutor's information. Justice Jackson in a dissent, to which Justice Frank-
furter said he must "yield," said that no emergency was shown, and that
the government tried to destroy a business by the suits resulting from
multiple seizures.
Judicially created limitations that might be imposed wheA injunctive
relief is sought are ripeness for review,84 primary jurisdiction,", and
exhaustion of administrative remedies s.8  It is not sufficient to give a
court jurisdiction if there is nothing more the certificate holder can do
within the agency as to the alleged irreparable injury. 7 Moreover,
the Administrator's "powers are obviously exclusive so far as the
administration of the Act is concerned. 88
The chances to reverse on appeal an order denying an injunction,8 9
or to have the agency's order stayed pending judicial review, ° are
82. 339 U.S. 594 (1950), 19 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 531 (1951), reversing 87 F. Supp. 650
(D.D.C. 1949), 25 N.Y.U.L. REV. 642 (1950).
83. 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (1958).
84. There must be a final order by the agency. McManus v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 286
F.2d 414 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961); APA § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(c). See
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) ; 3 DAVIS §§ 21.01-.10.
85. The agency rather than the court should make the initial decision. See Texas & Pac.
Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907); Isner v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n,
90 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Mich. 1950); 3 DAVIS §§ 19.01-.09. "[O]nly where the particular
agency has the authority to grant the relief requested by plaintiff [should] the primary
jurisdiction doctrine bar recourse to the courts." Schwartz, Primary Administrative Jurisdic-
tion and the Exhaustion of Litigants, 41 GEo. L.J. 495, 503-04 (1953).
86. All administrative remedies must be pursued before seeking judicial review. See
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); 3 DAVIS §§ 20.01-.10. As to
whether this is a discretionary rule, compare Smith v. United States, 199 F.2d 377, 381 (1st
Cir. 1952), with Red River Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 98 F.2d
282, 284 nn.4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 625 (1939).
87. Avon Dairy Co. v. Eisaman, 69 F. Supp. 500 (N.D. Ohio 1946).
88. Twentieth Century Airlines, Inc. v. Ryan, 74 Sup. Ct. 8, 11 (Reed, Circuit Justice,
1953) (CAB economic certificate).
89. There is no right to an injunction or a stay of an agency order when the case is
on appeal, even if irreparable injury may result. "It is an exercise of judicial discretion."
Virginian R.R. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926).
90. Section 10(d) of the APA provides for interim relief in the form of staying an
agency order by the reviewing court when "necessary to prevent irreparable injury." 5




remote since one of the conditions which is usually required to be met
is that there be no harm to the public interest.9 ' If interlocutory relief
is to be granted, the FAA must receive at least five days notice prior
to the court's granting of relief.92 The denial of an injunction does not
prevent the certificate holder from later receiving judicial review by
the statutory method after the CAB enters a final order."
C. Statutory Judicial Review
Judicial review of the final CAB order might not be an adequate
remedy since the emergency aspect of the order is likely to be con-
sidered moot on appeal. 4 However, it has been held that when the
specific issue has become moot, the court will still decide the general
question which may recur. 5 When judicial review is sought, the court
is bound by the FAA's or CAB's findings of fact if they are supported
by "substantial evidence." '
Section 1006 of the Act 97 provides for judicial review of an order
of the Administrator or the CAB. Subsection (a) provides that "any
order . . . shall be subject to review by the courts of appeals." Sub-
section (d) provides that "upon transmittal of the petition [for review]
to the Board or Administrator, the court shall have exclusive juris-
diction." Thus a literal reading of the section would mean that any
order, including an emergency order, is subject to judicial review. How-
ever, that clause has been interpreted to require the issuance of a final
order.99 Further, it is unclear if the word "shall" in subsection (a) is an
exclusive grant of jurisdiction, or if it gives the court of appeals juris-
diction in addition to the district courts that would normally have
jurisdiction under the APA 9 It should be noted that the "exclusive
91. Associated Sec. Corp. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 283 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1960) ;
Davis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 261 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
92. Act § 1006(d), 49 U.S.C. § 1486(d) (1958).
93. Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Tyler Gas Serv. Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 895 (1957).
94. See Brown v. Civil Aeronautics Authority, 119 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1941). In Nadiak v.
Civil Aeronautics Bd., 305 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1962), petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK
3221 (U.S. Jan. 3, 1963) (No. 719), the court did discuss certain aspects of the emergency
order although it was the final order which was before the court. See also Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. Boyd, 207 F. Supp. 153 (D.D.C. 1962).
95. Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515
(1911). Contra, Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 341 U.S. 901 (1951) (mem.),
vacating and remanding to dismiss as moot 185 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (economic cer-
tificate).
96. Act § 1006(e), 49 U.S.C. § 1486(e) ; Nebraska Dep't of Aeronautics v. Civil Aero-
nautics Bd., 298 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1962). See APA § 10(e) (B) (5), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (B) (5)
(1958); Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474: (1951).
97. 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1958).
98. McManus v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 286 F.2d 414 (2d Cir.),, cert. denied, 366 U.S.
928 (1961).
99. APA § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 1009. See City of Dallas v. Rentzel, 172 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 858 (1949).
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jurisdiction" clause of subsection (d) is not applicable until after the
petition for review is filed in the court of appeals. But a similar provision
applicable to the Federal Trade Commission' 0 has been interpreted
to mean that the court of appeals is the exclusive reviewing court.'
IV. THE PROPER COURT
A. Court of Appeals
A court of appeals has equity powers0 2 and can issue a temporary
injunction to prevent its losing jurisdiction of an administrative order.0 3
The court will not, however, hear a petition under the review provisions
of the Act when there was no quasi-judicial proceeding at which evidence
was presented, since there would be no intelligible basis for the court
to arrive at a decision.1"' Since the court of appeals has no original
jurisdiction to decide a case,0 5 it is doubtful whether review could be
obtained on the Administrator's ex parte order.
In order for the court of appeals to take jurisdiction under
section 1006, it must be shown to the court that the Administrator's
order was intended by Congress to come within that section. 06 If the
court of appeals has jurisdiction under the Act, any circuit in which the
petitioner resides, or has his principal place of business, or the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit would be proper °107
The judicial review provisions of the APA108 are not applicable to
the court of appeals. 0 9 The APA does give jurisdiction to the district
court, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has sug-
gested, in a case where the CAB order was not final, that the district
court would have original jurisdiction."0
B. District Court
If the court of appeals dismisses the petition on the basis that the
court has no jurisdiction, the action is not barred from being brought in
100. 15 U.S.C. § 45(d) (1958).
101. Aron v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 50 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1943). The same result
would probably apply to a FAA order. See Alexander v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 2 Av. Cas.
14,481 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
102. National Labor Relations Bd. v. Boss Mfg. Co., 107 F.2d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 1939);
3 DAvis § 23.03. The equitable doctrine of unclean hands is not applicable to judicial review.
Door v. Donaldson, 195 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
103. Cf. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Transamerica Corp., 184 F.2d 311
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 883 (1950).
104. Arrow Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 182 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950), incorporating by reference, United Gas Pipe
Line Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 181 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827
(1950).
105. Id. (by implication). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-94 (1958).
106. City of Dallas v. Rentzel, 172 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 858 (1949).
107. Act § 1006(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1486(b) (1958).
108. APA § 10, 5 U.S.C. 1009 (1958).
109. City of Dallas v. Rentzel, supra note 106.
110. Arrow Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., supra note 104.
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the district court."' The district court must take jurisdiction if the
complaint on its face asks for injunctive relief even if there is no merit
to the claim." 2 The judicial code gives the district courts original
jurisdiction of any action arising under an act of Congress regulating
commerce. 1 8 But that statute has been held inapplicable when Congress
has provided otherwise for judicial review of an agency's action."4
Section 10(c) of the APA" 5 emphasizes that an action must be
"final" prior to judicial review. However, the legislative history of that
section indicates that an administrative action is considered "final" as
long as it remains effective while the administrative process is being
exhausted and there is no other adequate remedy in any court."'
After the CAB has entered an order upholding the Administrator's
order, the district court will not take jurisdiction.117 No reported case has
been decided as to whether a district court can take jurisdiction over
FAA certificate orders." 8 However, in an analogous situation, a district
court took jurisdiction to decide if an injunction should be issued to
delay the effiective date of a FAA regulation forbidding commercial air
carriers from utilizing pilots over sixty years of age. While the court
denied the injunction and the court of appeals affirmed, neither discussed
the district court's jurisdiction." 9
Several regulatory agencies, like the National Labor Relations
Board, 120 have judicial review provisions in their statutes similar to
section 1006 of the Act. In Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,'
the Supreme Court held that the district court was without jurisdiction
to enjoin NLRB hearings since there was exclusive review in the court
of appeals. Yet the Myers case"z and subsequent cases 23 indicate that
the district court does have jurisdiction when the agency's action is
unconstitutional,124 contravenes a specific provision of the statute, 2 ' or
interferes with United States foreign policy. 26
111. Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939).
112. Ibid.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958).
114. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 300 (1943).
115. 5 U.S.C. § 1009(c) (1958).
116. Current Material, AD. L. Statutes 36, 83 (2d ser. 1951). See generally 3 DAVIS§ 20.08.
117. Alexander v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 2 Av. Cas. 14,481 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
118. But cf. World Wide Airlines, Inc. v. Lee, 4 Av. Cas. 17,406 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
119. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 182 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 276 F.2d 892
(2d Cir. 1960).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1958).
121. 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
122. Id. at 47.
123. E.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. McLeod, 302 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1962).
124. Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1949).
125. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
126. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S. A. v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 370 U.S. 915 (1962).
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* A district court asked to enjoin the Federal Trade Commission
declined jurisdiction on the basis that the court of appeals had exclusive
jurisdiction under the statute; 127 and in addition, since the enabling
statute provided for judicial review, 128 neither a district court nor a
court of appeals could enjoin a statutory proceeding by the agency.129
In Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,1 0 the Supreme Court
held that the district court had no jurisdiction to review seizures by
the' Food and Drug Administrator. The court pointed out that the
agency's determination of probable cause was not intended by Congress
to be reviewable.
Section 301(c) of the Act' provides:
The principal offiice of the [Federal Aviation] Agency shall
be in or near the District of Columbia, but it may act and
exercise all its power at any other place. The Agency shall have
an official seal which shall be judicially noticed.
A court will take judicial notice that the seal of an agency is located
in the District of Columbia.'82 Thus, the argument is made that the
official residence of the Administrator is in the District of Columbia, and
he may be sued only in a District of Columbia court for acts committed
in his official capacity. 8 '
1. THE ADMINISTRATOR AS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY
1 84
The FAA has decentralized its operations and maintains seven
regional offices headed by assistant administrators. 18 5 As a practical
matter, an emergency order would probably be issued from the regional
office in the vicinity where the violations were taking place. Since the
certificate-holder usually resides within that region, he would find it more
convenient to bring an action where the regional office is located rather
than in the District of Columbia. Even in situations where the regional
administrator institutes the action against the certificate holder, the
regional administrator probably could not be sued without joining the
127. 15 U.S.C. § 45(d) (1958).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1958).
129. Aron v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 50 F. Supp. 289, 290 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
130. 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
131. 49 U.S.C. § 1341(c) (1958).
132. Bradley Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 84 F.2d 97 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 559 (1936).
133. See World Wide Airlines, Inc. v. Lee, 4 Av. Cas. 17,406 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
134. The problem of what happens when the Administrator leaves office while a suit
is pending will not be discussed. See Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith, 165 U.S. 28 (1897);
3 DAvis § 27.09.
135. FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK OF AIATION 1-2 (1961); FEDERAL
AVIATION AGENCY, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT.45 (1961). The regional offices are located in:
Anchorage, Atlanta, Fort Worth, Honolulu, Kansas City, Los Angeles, and New York City.
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Administrator as an indispensable party.180 Failure to join an indis-
pensable party is a ground for dismissal."3 7
Sections 609 and 1005 of the Act vest all authority for emergency
orders in the Administrator. Section 303 (d)"I permits the Administrator
to delegate functions, but all delegatees are "under his jurisdiction." The
Supreme Court said in a case involving the Postmaster General:
[T]he superior officer is an indispensable party if the decree
granting the relief sought will require him to take action, either
by exercising directly a power lodged in him or by having a
subordinate exercise it for him. 9
Thus, if the acts of the regional administrator are performed as if
done by the Administrator, the Administrator is an indispensable party. 4"
Further, even if the regional administrator was enjoined, without the
Administrator being joined as a party, nothing would prevent the
Administrator from issuing a new emergency order. 4 ' A court of
equity will not do a futile act' 2
2. JURISDICTION OVER THE ADMINISTRATOR
If the Administrator is an indispensable party, then he must be
named as a defendant to the suit and the court must be able to secure
jurisdiction over him. 4 The court cannot secure jurisdiction over the
Administrator, when his headquarters are in the District of Columbia,
by service on a regional administrator. 44  A regional administrator
probably could be sued locally if he was acting without authority from
either the agency or the enabling statute. 45
Jurisdiction may not be remedied when the suit is brought outside
136. An indispensable party is one without which the court cannot enter a "just and
equitable judgment." 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE IT 21.04, at 2906 (2d ed.,1948). See gen-
erally 3 DAVIS § 27.08.
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7).
138. 49 U.S.C. § 1344(d) (1958).
139. Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490, 493 (1947).
140. See Gnerich v. Rutter, 265 U.S. 388, 391 (1924).
141. Compare Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 53 (1955).
142. See LEWIS & SPELLING, THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS (1926); WALSN, EQUITY § 64
(1930).
143. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (2).
144. Alexander v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 2 Av. Cas. 14,481 (E.D.N.Y. 1947); accord,
Bradley Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 84 F.2d 97 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 559 (1936); Napier v. Veterans Administration, 187 F. Supp. 723 (D.N.J. 1960),
aff'd, 298 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1962) (service on regional attorney); Regina Cargo Airlines,
Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 10 F.R.D. 628 (E.D.N.Y. 1950); Olin Industries, Inc. v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Bd., 72 F. Supp. 225 (D. Mass. 1947) ; Peoples Bank v. Federal. Re-
serve Bank, 58 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Cal. 1944), appeal dismissed, 149 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1945).
See also FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
145. Bradley Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., supra note 144, at 99
(dictum).
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the District of Columbia by personally serving the Administrator in
the District.146 Nor is service proper by leaving the summons at the
personal home of the Administrator when his home is within the court's
jurisdiction; 147 nor by securing personal service on the Administrator
when he physically comes into that particular jurisdiction. 48 A court
may not enter an injunction against an agency on the assumption that it
has jurisdiction,' 49 but it is undecided if a court could authorize sub-
stituted service on the Administrator. 5 °
Even if jurisdiction over the Administrator is obtained in a court
outside the District of Columbia, a motion to dismiss for improper
venue is appropriate.' 5' In a case based upon a federal question, venue
is where the defendant resides.'52 The District of Columbia is considered
the official residence for officers of the United States and they cannot be
sued outside the District of Columbia without their consent.'53 The




Since Marbury v. Madison' it has been recognized that the courts
cannot review discretionary acts of the President. But it also has been
recognized that a lesser official "is amenable to the laws for his conduct,
and cannot, at his discretion, sport away the vested rights of others.' 57
146. Heiser Ready Mix Co. v. Fenton, 265 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1959); Berlinsky v. Woods,
178 F.2d 265 (4th Cir. 1949) cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950); Napier v. Veterans Ad-
ministration, supra note 144.
147. Garden Homes, Inc. v. Mason, 238 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1956). But see Royal Farm
Dairy, Inc. v. Wallace, 7 F. Supp. 560 (D. Md. 1934) (semble). As to obtaining jurisdiction
by attachment of realty in a state court see Garden Homes v. Mason, 142 F. Supp. 744
(D.N.H.), appeal dismissed, 238 F.2d 654 (1st Cir. 1956).
148. Martinez v. Seaton, 285 F.2d 587 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 946 (1961);
Royal Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Wallace, 7 F. Supp. 560 (D. Md. 1934).
149. Eighth Regional War Labor Bd. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 145 F.2d 462 (5th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 883 (1945).
150. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947). If judicial review is provided for by
statute in a district court outside the District of Columbia, then substituted service is
proper. See procedure for securing substituted service outlined in Davis v. Flemming, 23
F.R.D. 139 (W.D. Mo. 1959).
151. See Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512 (1952) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1958).
153. Mission Beverage Co. v. Porter, 72 F. Supp. 568 (N.D.N.Y. 1947). A government
agency, even if referred to as a "body corporate," is not "doing business" within the mean-
ing of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958), permitting venue where a corporation is doing business.
Isner v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 90 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
154. Act § 1007, 49 U.S.C. § 1487 (1958).
155. See Smart v. Woods, 184 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 936
(1951).
156. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). A more recent case is United States v. George S.
Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371 (1940).
157. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803).
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However, language is frequently found to the effect that "if the word
'discretion' means anything in a statutory or administrtaive grant of
power, it means that the recipient must exercise his authority according
to his own understanding and conscience."158
Section 10(e) of the APA5 9 prrovides that agency action may be
set aside when it is found to be "arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." However, all parts
of Section 10 are prefaced by the exception to judicial review so far as
''agency action is by law committed to agency discretion." Thus,
Section 10 says simultaneously that an abuse of discretion is reviewable
but that acts which are committed to agency discretion are not review-
able.16° The intent of Congress was probably to limit review of dis-
cretionary acts to the issue of abuse of discretion.' 6 ' The District of
Columbia Circuit has adopted that view.' 62 On the other hand the Ninth
Circuit has construed the APA literally, resulting in the withholding of
judicial review of discretionary acts.' However, the Ninth Circuit has
held that if the act of discretion is one which the courts have frequent
occasion to consider, and one with respect to which the agency has no
superior opportunity for knowledge, then the action is reviewable.",
B. EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 6 5
In Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,'66 the Supreme Court in
permitting the Food and Drug Administrator to seize misbranded articles
said:
Discretion of any official may be abused. Yet it is not a re-
quirement of due process that there be judicial inquiry before
discretion can be exercised. It is sufficient, where only property
rights are concerned, that there is at some stage an opportuntiy
for a hearing and a judicial determination. 167
158. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1954).
159. 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1958).
160. See 3 DAVIs § 28.16. This has been referred to as "one of the most poorly drawn
provisions of the APA." Schwartz, The Administrative Procedure Act in Operation, 29
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1173, 1246 (1954). See also Blachly, Critique of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, in THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT AND THE ADMINITRATIVE
AGENciES 30, 55 (Warren ed. 1947).
161. Schwartz, supra note 160, at 1249.
162. Homovich v. Chapman, 191 F.2d 761, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
163. Sellas v. Kirk, 200 F.2d 217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 'U.S. 940 (1953).
164. National Labor Relations Bd. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141, 150-51 (9th
Cir. 1952).
165. The Privy Council in England upheld an act permitting the Colonial Governor
of Cyprus to declare a state of emergency and to make "such regulations as appear to him
to be necessary or expedient for securing the public safety." It was enough that the Governor
was satisfied that there were grounds on which he might use his emergency powers. Ross-
Clunis v. Papadopoullos, [1958] 1 Weekly L.R. 546 (P.C.), 21 MODERN L. REV. 411.
166. 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
167. Id. at 599. See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that the petitioner should
be given an opportunity by the courts to prove that there was an abuse of
discretion.
The lower Federal courts have followed the majority rationale of
Ewing. A district court granted an injunction when it found that no
emergency existed warranting the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to
appoint a conservator for a bank without notice or hearing. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the basis that "on its face the
statute gives the Board an absolute discretion."'1 68 Likewise, the District
Court for the District of Columbia refused to restrain government
officials from seizing drugs alleged to be unsafe. The court pointed out
that when discretion is involved, it is the good faith of the official which
is material, not whether his conclusions might be factually or legally
erroneous. 169
VI. PREVENTIvE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
A. Expertise in Air Safety
A corollary to agency discretion is the expertise of an agency.170
An agency will not have its decisions inquired into by the reviewing
court when they are based upon the agency's expert knowledge.' 71
Usually when a court substitutes its judgment for an administrative
determination it is in a case involving constitutional, statutory, or
procedural problems.172
The President and Congress select an Administrator for the FAA
whom they believe to be an expert in air safety.' The courts have
recognized the expertise of the Administrator and the CAB.
Particulary in the field of safety regulations, which are in-
herently matters of opinion involving many complex and
technical considerations, a court should not interfere with the
expert judgment of the Board, absent a clear showing that the
Board has acted beyond its power or otherwise improvidently.
But it would not be proper for [a judge] simply to substi-
tute different views for those of the Board, duly reached in the
168. Greater Del. Valley Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd.,
262 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1958).."
169. Merritt Corp. v. Folsom, 165 F. Supp. 418, 421 (D.D.C. 1958). See also Tidal
Osage Oil Co. v. West, 30 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 855 (1929).
170. See Moog Industries, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 355 U.S. 411 (1958). Com-
pare Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Cogan, 201 F.2d 78, 86 (9th Cir. 1952) (on rehearing).
171. Moog Industries, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 355 U.S. 411 (1958); Gray v.
Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941); Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U.S.
537, 564-65 (1928).
172. 4 DAVIS § 30.07.
173. See Act §§ 301(a), (b), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a), (b) (1958).
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exercise of its expert judgment and responsibilities to the
public.174
The courts have recognized that in air safety the Administrator must
be able to act speedily;171 to use the remedy he sees fit, 176 even when
it is "severe under the circumstances"; 17 and to suspend certificates for
reasons other than technical proficiency.7 7 A district court has said that
a complaint, for an injunction to delay the effective date of the maximum
age of pilots, "borders on vulgarity" when the dollar loss of approxi-
mately forty pilots is weighed against the safety of an estimated
846,000 passengers who would be carried by these pilots if the injunction
were granted. 79 The Ninth Circuit refused to stay a suspension order
when one of the conditions of the order was to test the pilot before the
suspension would be terminated, saying: "We cannot make an order
to jeopardize the safety of the public."'8 0 It should be noted that in
non-safety cases under the Act, courts have not given the CAB as
much leeway in entering an order as they do in safety cases.'
The most recent case on air safety and the first case involving an
emergency order 8 2 under section 609 of the Act is Nadiak v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd.,88 decided in 1962 by the Fifth Circuit.8 Nadiak's
pilot certificate was revoked on an emergency basis after the FAA
investigated his twelve years as a professional pilot when Nadiak con-
tested a proposed sixty day suspension.' The court affirmed the CAB's
174. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 215 F.2d 122, 125-26 (2d Cir. 1954)
(Harlan, Circuit Judge).
175. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 897 (2d Cir. 1960).
176. Wilson v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 244 F.2d 773 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
870 (1957).
177. Garber v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 276 F.2d 321, 323 (2d Cir. 1960). See Walker v.
Civil Aeronautics Bd., 251 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1958).
178. Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 305 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1962), petition for cert.
filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEx 3221 (U.S. Jan. 3, 1963) (No. 719); Spect v. Civil Aeronautics Bd.,
254 F.2d 905, 916 (8th Cir. 1958). As to airmen's licenses generally, see Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d
1150 (1961).
179. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 182 F. Supp. 595, 596 (S.D-N.Y.), aff'd, 276 F.2d
892 (2d Cir. 1960).
180. Brown v. Civil Aeronautics Authority, 112 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1940).
181. See American Air Transport v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 98 F. Supp. 660 (D.D.C.
1951), certificate'dismissed, 344 U.S. 4, on remand, 201 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1952). Compare
Standard Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 177 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949), with R. A.
Holman & Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 299 F.2d 127, 132 n.9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 911 (1962). "[P]robably in no other industry do considerations of safety so affect
the economic well-being of an industry as in air transportation." TwosAs, ECONOMIC
REGuLATION OP AIR TRANSPORT 48 (1951).
182. A previous case involved an airman who claimed that an emergency existed in
flight as a defense to his violation of the Civil Air Regulations. Spect v. Civil Aeronautics
Bd., 254 F.2d 905 (8th Cir. 1958).
183. 305 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1962), petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3221 (U.S.
Jan. 3, 1963) (No. 719).
184. The opinion was written for a unanimous court by Circuit Judge Brown. Chief
Judge Tuttle and Circuit Judge Bell were also on the bench.
185. The suspension would have deprived him of his Airline Transport Certificate. He
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order upholding the FAA,' but was disturbed over what it called
"the blunderbuss nature of the charges" brought by the FAA." 7 The
court very carefully scrutinized the basis for the FAA's emergency
order to make sure that there was no substance to Nadiak's claim that
union pilots created the charges against him since he was one of the
few remaining "scab" pilots with the airline.""8
In its entirety the Nadiak decision is favorable to the FAA. But
it exemplifies the fact that the FAA can misuse its emergency powers
and that the court, on review of the final order, will examine the pro-
cedures used.' It could be implied from the decision that if the
Administrator used his emergency powers incorrectly, the final order
would be set aside. 90
B. Jurisdictional Limitation on the Courts
The eventual review by the court of appeals does not give the
certificate holder the remedy he desires, since he would be unable to
use his certificate until he received a favorable ruling from the court. But
is this judicially wrong? Can it not be said that Congress intentionally
built this hardship into the Act? During World War II Congress enacted
the Emergency Price Control Act, 1 1 which prohibited the staying of
any order during the review process. The Supreme Court upheld the
procedure on the basis that "when justified by compelling public inter-
would still have bad a Commercial Pilot Certificate which would permit him to work as a
co-pilot. See 14 C.F.R. § 40.300 (1962).
186. Nadiak will be eligible to make application for another pilot certificate in one
year. The purpose of the revocation is public safety, not punishment. Nadiak v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 305 F.2d 588, 590 n.1 (5th Cir. 1962).
187. The FAA listed 23 charges against Nadiak. Among them were charges that he
reported for duty two minutes prior to the scheduled departure time, that he carried a case
of beer under his arm, and that he pushed a power mower across the ramp at Miami, Florida.
Five of the charges involving "in flight" violations were considered substantial enough to
warrant an emergency revocation.
It should be noted that when an order of revocation is not based on one fault standing
alone, but a sum of findings of fault, if any one finding of fault contains error, the ultimate
conclusion cannot stand. Carey v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 275 F.2d 518 (1st Cir. 1960).
188. Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 305 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1962).
189. While we fully appreciate the zealousness of the Administrator in carrying out
his assigned responsibilities of promoting safety in the air lanes and the practical
problems in doing so within limited time schedules, fundamental notions of fair
play dictate that one called upon to defend truly serious charges in an emergency
proceeding ought not to have adjudication of such substantial matters exposed to
the possibility of inflammatory contamination by stale or trivial incidents. Id.
at 591.
190. The public-including judges who fly-has a vital interest in air safety. Re-
sponsibility for air safety has been placed in the administrative hands of those
deemed by Congress to have an expert competence. Air safety was of primary
importance in the adjudication of this case. The determination was that air safety
would be promoted by the certificate revocation. After permissible credibility choices,
the findings were that numerous regulations and rules of the air lanes-which must
not be ignored or taken lightly-had been violated. Those findings were supported
by substantial evidence in a hearing which was fair and regular. There it ends. Id.
at 595.
191. January 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
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est the legislature may authorize summary action subject to later
judicial review of its validity."' 92 Congress has also enacted statutes
which provide for no judicial review.' 93
It appears clear that the grant of emergency powers to the FAA
does not violate the due process clause. The mode of review, if there is
one, is by injunctive relief in the District Court for the District of
Columbia. In Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,' which most
closely parallels factually the instant situation, the Court held that a
district court had no jurisdiction to review the probable cause deter-
mination of the Food and Drug Administrator: "At times a preliminary
decision by an agency is a step in an administrative proceeding.' 95
To have held otherwise would have been to destroy the effectiveness
of the "speedy, preventive device" which Congress created for the
protection of the public.'96
The Ewing case is a clear articulation of the rule that when
Congress authorizes a preventive administrative proceeding to protect
the public, a court has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction prior to
the completion of the statutory remedies, regardless of allegations of
irreparable injury. A fortiori, a court should lack jurisdiction to issue an
injunction when the effect would be to permit unsafe aircraft or un-
qualified airmen to fly, endangering not only the lives of passengers, but
also the safety of the populace on the ground below. This kind of
situation is certainly more hazardous to the public's safety than mis-
labeled food which was not injurious to health. If any agency can show
the need for securing injunctive relief in the courts it is the FAA. It is
the public who will suffer irreparable injury if an air accident occurs
because the suspended certificate holder continues his activities.9 7
The proverbial barn door, which today is on an airplane hangar, is
being closed by the FAA before the airplane gets out.
192. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 442 (1944).
193. No judicial review is permitted from a denial of veterans benefits. 38 U.S.C. § 211
(1958) ; United States v. Mroch, 88 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1937); accord, Van Home v. Hines,
122 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 689 (1941). But see Wellman v. Whittier,
259 F.2d 163, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (dictum) ; Hines v. United States ex rel. Marsh, 105 F.2d
85 (D.C. Cir. 1939). See also APA § 10(1), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(1) (1958).
194. 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
195. Id. at 598.
196. Id. at 601.
197. Is it sound public policy to allow an interested party to cause even a short
delay in cases where the very lives of the members of the community may be at
stake? Does it not render the law absurd to say in one breath that public necessityjustifies summary action without a prior administrative hearing, and in the next
breath that an individual may delay proceedings by seeking a prior judicial hear-
ing, while disaster may result from the substitution of the judgment of judges for
that of health officers? Is this not rendered all the more absurd in communities
where the public health services are manned by trained and experienced experts?
Is it possible to segregate real emergency cases from abatement cases where no
urgency exists, and where therefore an injunction might be tolerable? HART, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTWATivE LAW 568 (2d ed. 1950).
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The CAB has recognized this view. The CAB will not review the
emergency aspect of a certificate suspension and will dismiss a petition
asking for review. The CAB "does not believe that it should attempt to
delineate the various circumstances in which public safety may require
suspension or revocation." 9 A court should adopt the same view.
Of course it is more convenient from a judicial standpoint for
Congress to amend the Act to say that a court cannot use its equity
powers when the Administrator determines an emergency exists under
sections 609 or 1005.111 But the legislative history of the Act, the
recognition given by the courts to the discretion and expertise of
the Administrator in air safety, and the practical considerations of pro-
tecting the safety of the public in a situation where it is impossible
for the public to protect itself, should require a court to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter a complaint seeking injunctive or
extraordinary relief against an emergency order of the FAA. This dis-
missal would be proper because the Administrator's order is a preventive
administrative proceeding.
In construing the enforcement provisions of legislation ...it
is important to remember that courts and administrative
agencies are collaborative "instrumentalities of justice," and
not business rivals.s°
198. Leonard J. Spect, 25 C.A.B. 859, 891, 893 (Order E-11159, 1957), aff'd as to other
orders, 2S4 F.2d 905 (8th Cir. 1958) ; accord, Richard S. Ewing, 26 C.A.B. 816 (1957).
199. Professor Hart wonders if that type of statute would be constitutional. HART, Op.
cit. supra note 197, at 569. The Ewing case, decided the same year Hart's book was published,
would appear to say-yesI
200. Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287, 295 (1946).
